Remarks by Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte
U.S. Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency
and the United Nations Office in Vienna
Economic Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV)
Ankara, Turkey
April 29, 2008
United States and Turkey:
Strategic Allies for Global Challenges
I am pleased to be back in Turkey, an important ally and great friend of the United States. I am honored to be here as part of a bilateral dialogue that has been carried out by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rice, and acting Undersecretary Fried. This is a dialogue of strategic importance on shared concerns about terrorism, proliferation, and regional stability.
I first came to Ankara in the early 1990s, leading a delegation from NATO. It was a time when the countries of Central Europe were celebrating the end of the Cold War. But coming to Turkey, I realized that one very important NATO ally was still situated in a very dangerous part of the world.
And, as I return now, I know that you still live in a dangerous part of the world. Consider last week’s revelations about Syria’s nuclear activities, or the recent defiant announcement by President Ahmadi-Nejad that Iran will expand its uranium enrichment capabilities in violation of multiple Security Council resolutions.
I also know that we have important work to do together in confronting these and other challenges while also capitalizing on opportunities to build regional peace and prosperity.
Today I would like to address two areas where our cooperation is essential:
• pursuing the benefits of nuclear energy while reducing the risk of proliferating nuclear weapons; and
• preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the regime in Iran, whose leaders are already a source of terrorism and instability in the region.
Pursuing the Benefits of Nuclear Energy while Reducing the Proliferation Risks
An increasing number of countries are looking at nuclear energy as a way to power growth and development while preserving existing energy supplies, diversifying energy sources, and protecting the environment.
In 2007, new reactors were connected to the electrical grid in China, India and Romania, and construction started on seven more. In the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission received four license applications, the first for new plants in nearly 30 years. In March, your Energy Minister announced that Turkey is accepting bids for its first nuclear power plant.
The IAEA projects that from 178 to 357 new reactors will be built worldwide by 2030 and that, taking into account the retirement of existing reactors, the amount of electricity generated by nuclear power will increase by 25 to 95 percent.
The United States is a strong supporter of nuclear energy. We encourage and support other countries in pursuing nuclear energy as long as they are committed to observing international obligations and international standards regulating safety, security, and nonproliferation. In this regard, the United States is pleased to have concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement with Turkey, which now sits before our Congress. The Agreement provides a comprehensive framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation based on a mutual commitment to nuclear nonproliferation.
Fortunately, the intentions of most countries are entirely peaceful. Unfortunately, there are exceptions, and the same technology used to enrich uranium to use as fuel for nuclear power reactors can also be used to produce highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.
Indeed, the ability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons under the guise of a peaceful program is a recognized “loophole” in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This is a loophole we all must address as more and more countries look to nuclear energy. This is not about the rights of countries to nuclear technology -- that right is not disputed. This is about advancing those rights while protecting against the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.
Most countries that have nuclear power do not produce the fissile fuel for their reactors. Building the necessary facilities is costly and time-consuming -- not a sound economic choice for most. Advanced countries with sophisticated nuclear energy programs, such as Sweden and South Korea, enjoy the benefits of nuclear power without producing their own fuel. They rely on the commercial market, which is diversified and reliable.
To help countries gain access to nuclear power, while discouraging the spread of uranium enrichment technologies, a wide range of countries and experts have proposed backing the commercial market with international assurances of fuel supply.
In June of last year, Dr. ElBaradei produced a report describing a multilateral framework for assuring the supply of nuclear fuel. This framework can accommodate a variety of concepts, from IAEA-administered supply arrangements to actual “fuel banks” under IAEA or national control.
Participation in these fuel supply assurances would be a voluntary decision on the part of sovereign governments. No country would give up rights or accept new obligations. Instead, the goal is to help countries gain access to nuclear power while providing a viable and economically-sound alternative to acquiring sensitive technologies. The approach closest to fruition has been proposed by Russia, which is now negotiating with the IAEA to make two reactor loads of low enriched uranium available to the Agency as a nuclear fuel bank.
The United States stands ready to support these efforts. Our Department of Energy is down-blending 17 metric tons of highly enriched uranium from our military stockpile to low enriched uranium suitable for reactor fuel. This will be placed in a national reserve available to support fuel supply assurances. We are also pledging 50 million dollars to support the establishment of an IAEA international fuel bank.
The IAEA has been considering multilateral arrangements for fuel supply assurances for the last fifty years. We now see the need and opportunity to move from lengthy consideration to considered decisions. We hope that Turkey, which joins the IAEA Board this fall, will be ready to support these decisions both to advance our common interest in nonproliferation as well as Turkey’s own interest in nuclear power.
Looking beyond today’s technologies and concepts, the United States launched the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, or GNEP, and invited Turkey to join.
GNEP is based on a common vision of expanding nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in a safe and secure manner. GNEP is exploring future technologies and concepts that would reshape the nuclear fuel cycle to make it more proliferation-resistant while reducing the waste destined for long-term storage. GNEP is also working on advanced technologies in reactor design and infrastructure with a special emphasis on the requirements of developing countries.
GNEP has seen impressive growth. At its second meeting last September, GNEP tripled in size to 16 partners, and just recently grew to 21. Participants come from all parts of the world and all stages of nuclear development, from advanced nuclear states like France, Russia, and China to countries now considering nuclear power, like Jordan and Senegal.
Turkey is presently an observer in GNEP. We hope that Turkey will become a full partner so that your country can share experiences with others while helping to shape the future of nuclear energy.
There is rising interest in nuclear energy in countries across the Middle East. Jordan has joined GNEP, and Egypt is an active observer. The Gulf Cooperation Council has worked with the IAEA on a feasibility study on peaceful applications of nuclear power. Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have announced their interest in nuclear technology for electrical power. In their recent announcements, Bahrain and the UAE
have set a fine model. Both governments have committed to the highest standards of safety, security, and nonproliferation. Both have announced their intention to purchase nuclear fuel from the international market rather than making a costly investment in sensitive technologies that can be misused to produce weapons material. The peaceful model they are setting stands in stark contrast to the actions of Iran.
Where Iran has violated safeguards obligations, Bahrain and the UAE have committed to honor them. Where Iran has refused full cooperation with the IAEA, Bahrain and the UAE intend to provide full transparency, including through implementation of the Additional Protocol. Where Iran has pursued sensitive technologies not necessary for a civil program, Bahrain and the UAE intend to focus their investment on nuclear power generation.
The Proliferation Threat Posed by Iran
Iran, in stark contrast, poses a menacing model. The nuclear pursuits of its leaders threaten peace and security in the region as well as the global nonproliferation regime. Iran has violated the NPT, abused the NPT, and threatens to overturn the NPT in one of the world’s most dangerous regions.
The U.S. Intelligence Community judges, with high confidence, that Iran was working until late 2003 on nuclear weapons design, weaponization, and covert uranium conversion and enrichment. This was no hobby or academic pursuit. This was a concerted, covert program, conducted by military entities, under the direction of Iran’s senior leaders.
Our Intelligence Community assesses that Iran’s leaders quietly halted this work, when Iran’s nuclear activities were coming under increasing international scrutiny and pressure. This unannounced halt of covert weaponization work came at the same time that Iran’s leaders publicly suspended uranium enrichment-related activities. Iran’s leaders have since restarted uranium enrichment activities, despite international sanctions. They could similarly decide to restart the weapons-related work necessary to fashion highly enriched uranium into nuclear weapons.
Indeed, while the Intelligence Community has high confidence that weaponization activities stopped in 2003 for at least several years, it has only moderate confidence that they have not since restarted. And, given Iran’s long and established track record of deceit and concealment, there is no assurance that the IAEA would know that Iran had resumed weaponization work, especially given Iran’s failure to heed IAEA requests for full transparency.
In the meantime, Iran continues working to master uranium enrichment, which could be readily applied to producing highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons.
Just this month, President Ahmadi-Nejad announced plans to further expand Iran’s capability for uranium enrichment in violation of multiple Security Council resolutions.
Producing fissile material -- whether highly-enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium – is the most technically-challenging and time-consuming part of building a nuclear weapon. Despite grand announcements by President Ahmadi-Nejad, we believe that Iran has yet to master the technology for uranium enrichment. But, they clearly are working to do so, including by developing new generations of centrifuges. The enrichment technology that Iran is mastering today could be readily replicated at a covert facility.
Our Intelligence Community still assesses that Iran could produce enough highly-enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon sometime between 2010 and 2015.
Iran claims that it is developing an enrichment capability to produce nuclear fuel for power reactors. But Iran has no functioning power reactors. The one reactor under construction, at Bushehr, has recently received the necessary fuel from Russia as part of a ten-year contract, extendable for the entire lifetime of the reactor.
The production of fissile material and the ability to fashion it into a weapon are two basic parts of a nuclear weapons program. The third is developing an effective means for delivery.
Iran has deployed and regularly exercises the Shahab-3 ballistic missile, which has a range of 1300 kilometers. It has claimed that it now has a missile with a range of about 2000 kilometers and that it is developing a missile of even longer range. The deployed Shahab-3 could strike most of Turkey and the Middle East, and the longer-range missiles would reach deeper into Europe.
A nuclear-armed Iran would pose a grave threat for both our countries and the world more generally. Iran’s leaders support global terrorism, oppose Middle East peace, and harbor ambitions of regional hegemony. Armed with nuclear weapons, they could become even more emboldened. Moreover, continued pursuit of capabilities that could be used for a nuclear weapon increases the risk that other countries in the region will seek to acquire nuclear weapons or that nuclear weapons will end up in the hands of terrorists.
Iran’s NPT abuses, if left unchecked, threaten to spark a nuclear arms race that, in turn, could leave the region and the world more at risk of nuclear war or terrorism.
Our Role at the IAEA
In five weeks, the IAEA Board of Governors will be meeting to consider the next report by Director General Mohammed ElBaradei. This report will go both to the Board and the Security Council.
The Director General’s last report described some progress in clarifying Iran’s declarations about its past nuclear activities. This was encouraging, though the information provided by Iran was long overdue and is still to be verified. However, Dr. ElBaradei also reported that troubling questions remain about serious indications that Iran has engaged in weapons-related activities.
In January 2006, the IAEA’s Deputy Director General for Safeguards first reported concerns about Iranian activities with a “military nuclear dimension.” In the Director General’s last report and a supporting technical briefing, the IAEA’s very competent inspectors presented a troubling mosaic of weapon-related activities. These include:
• flow sheets for a uranium conversion process different from Iran’s declared activities;
• a document, whose origins are yet to be fully explained, describing the procedures for casting and machining of uranium metal into hemispheres;
• development of a special detonator and the capability to fire multiple detonators simultaneously;
• schematics describing a Shahab-3 missile re-entry vehicle modified in a way that, in the judgment of the Agency, is “quite likely to be able to accommodate a nuclear device;” and
• an explosive testing arrangement involving a 400-meter shaft and a firing capability 10 kilometers away.
Now, I am not an engineer. But I suspect that technicians don’t need to shelter themselves ten kilometers away to test conventional weapons. Instead, as the Director General reported, these various activities are “relevant to nuclear weapon research and development” and uranium metal hemispheres are “components of nuclear weapons.”
The overall effort described by the Secretariat -- involving personnel and institutes throughout Iran -- strongly suggests an organized program conducted at the direction of Iran’s leadership.
Iran has dismissed much of this information, calling it “baseless allegations.” But in a detailed technical briefing, the chief IAEA inspector explained why he cannot accept this conclusion. He explained how the IAEA had assembled this information over many years and from multiple sources, including its own investigations. And he explained the linkages between the activities and why they are consistent with research and development of nuclear weapons.
This is a serious matter, which IAEA inspectors continue to investigate. The IAEA needs to understand Iran’s past weapons-related work to verify its current declarations. And understanding Iran’s past weapons-related work will better position the IAEA to detect, and thereby, we hope, deter – a resumption of those activities, either now or when Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities are sufficiently advanced.
Last week the IAEA Secretariat announced Iran’s agreement to a “process” to discuss weaponization. A process is nice, but we are interested in results. If Iran explains the significant amount of information on weaponization that the IAEA has collected, this process will be a positive step forward. However, this is not the first time that Iran has agreed to address the IAEA’s concerns about weaponization. The issue has been on the table since 2005. As the due date for the Director General’s report comes closer, we will be on the lookout for a familiar Iranian ploy: limited cooperation without full disclosure of past or current activities or compliance with Security Council resolutions.
Our Dual-Track Strategy Toward Peaceful Resolution
Last month, upon adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1803, six Foreign Ministers from Europe, Russia, China, and the United States issued a statement reiterating international concern about the proliferation risks of Iran’s nuclear program. They also reaffirmed our collective dual-track strategy toward a peaceful resolution.
The first track of the strategy is a negotiating track. In June 2006, the Foreign Ministers of the six countries made an important and generous offer to Iran. In their March statement, the Ministers reconfirmed their previous proposals and their willingness to further develop them.
The June 2006 offer contains substantial opportunities for political, security and economic benefits to Iran and to the region. The offer would help Iran attain what its leaders claim they want from their nuclear program: international recognition; economic benefits; advanced technologies; and a new source of electricity with a guaranteed supply of fuel that would reserve more oil and gas for sale on the world market.
The six-country offer remains on the table. Moreover, the Security Council affirmed its intention to suspend the sanctions it has adopted thus far if and for so long as Iran fully and verifiably suspends enrichment-related and heavy water-related activities to allow for negotiations between the six countries and Iran. And Secretary Rice announced that she would be prepared to join those negotiations, sitting down with her Iranian counterpart anytime, anywhere.
Suspension remains imperative because producing fissile material is the most technically-challenging and time-consuming part of building a weapon. Suspension remains imperative because our Intelligence Community judged that Iran’s effort to master enrichment technology, not necessary for its civil program, is part of its deliberate effort to keep open the option to develop nuclear weapons. Suspension remains imperative because the IAEA Board and the UN Security Council have lost confidence that Iran’s nuclear activities are exclusively peaceful. Finally, suspension is necessary to ensure that Iran enters into any negotiations in good faith and does not try to drag out negotiations to provide cover for its nuclear advances.
The second track of the dual-track strategy involves diplomatic pressure and targeted sanctions to convince Iran’s leaders to choose serious negotiation over continued defiance. On March 3, the UN Security Council reinforced this track by adopting Resolution 1803 with a third set of binding sanctions on Iran.
These sanctions are targeted on Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities as well as their production of ballistic missiles. They are targeted on the material and technology needed for these activities and on the individuals, organizations, and banks involved. Like the previous sanctions on which they build, the goal is not to penalize the Iranian people. The goal is to change the strategic calculus of their leaders.
Iran’s leaders presumably want respect, security, and technological achievement. We need to convince them that the best course to these ends is to choose negotiation and civil nuclear benefits over further sanctions and isolation. We will only succeed in doing so by sustaining our strategy, fully implementing the Security Council’s resolutions, and sending a collective message, in words and deeds, that is clear and consistent.
This is not a time for complacency. This is not a time for business as usual. This is a time to signal clearly to Iran’s leadership that their continued violation of Security Council resolutions cannot be tolerated.
Syria’s Covert Nuclear Activities
The danger of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East was underscored last week when we briefed your government and others on Syria’s construction of a clandestine nuclear reactor.
We believe -- based on strong evidence -- that North Korea assisted Syria with the construction of this reactor. We also have good reason to believe this reactor was not intended for peaceful purposes. Instead, the reactor, constructed in secret and in violation of IAEA safeguards requirements, was configured to produce plutonium -- which, together with highly-enriched uranium -- is one of the two fissile materials that can be fashioned into a nuclear weapon.
The construction of this reactor was a dangerous and potentially destabilizing development for the region and the world. We hope that this will be a reminder of the need to redouble international efforts to end such activities and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to show states that there are costs for violating international norms and obligations, and to persuade states that the path to security and stability is through engagement and transparency. We welcome the IAEA’s intention to investigate these new revelations and will support this effort to the maximum extent possible.
United States and Turkey
Whether pursuing nuclear energy or confronting proliferation, the United States and Turkey have common interests that are best pursued through a common approach.
We both know the dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran. We must continue our joint effort to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons or a breakout capability. We appreciate Turkey’s active diplomatic engagement in support of our common strategy. Full implementation of Security Council resolutions is also essential.
The United States looks forward to close cooperation with Turkey in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership and in implementing IAEA-administered mechanisms for reliable access to nuclear fuel. Subject to Congressional consent, we look forward to implementing the U.S.-Turkey agreement on nuclear cooperation as your country looks to take advantage of the peaceful applications of nuclear technology. The agreement stands as an important part of our strategic partnership,a partnership of great importance to both our countries.
Secretary Rice recently said that“Lord Palmerston got it wrong when he said that ‘nations have no permanent allies.’ The United States does have permanent allies and those are nations with which we share values and we have, therefore, a permanent friend and ally in Turkey.
