IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, June 2-6, 2008 Agenda Item 7(c) Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran Statement by Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte U.S. Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency
Mr. Chairman,
I commend the Director General and Secretariat for their continuing investigation into Iran’s nuclear activities. My delegation also thanks the Director General for his comprehensive report on the Secretariat’s efforts to address its "serious concerns" with indications that Iran has engaged in clandestine nuclear activities with possible military dimensions.
I must also echo the Director General who, in his opening statement to the Board, expressed regret that there is no real progress to report.
Despite several months of intense discussions between the IAEA and Iran, which follow years of interactions on weaponization concerns, Iran has yet to provide any real answers to the IAEA’s questions. Iran has instead chosen to deride the IAEA’s questions as "baseless allegations," a charge that the Secretariat and this Board cannot accept.
The questions that remain unanswered strongly suggest Iran has undertaken a significant state-sponsored effort to develop nuclear weapons, an effort that Agency inspectors are not in a position to verify has halted. The report also confirms that Iran continues to refuse to comply with its legal obligation, included in three Chapter VII resolutions of the Security Council, to fully and verifiably suspend all uranium enrichment- and heavy water-related activities. Nor has Iran provided the level of transparency necessary – through the implementation of the Additional Protocol, in particular – for the IAEA to provide any assurances regarding the non-existence of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including with respect to reprocessing.
Mr. Chairman,
The Director General’s latest report builds on the extensive description of Iran’s nuclear weapons-related activities provided by the Secretariat in February 2008 and beforehand. The report makes clear that Iran has failed to provide any substantive explanation for these activities or the documentation with which it has been confronted. Iran has also failed to provide "the Agency with all the information, access to documents, and access to individuals necessary to support Iran’s statements."
In the absence of an explanation from Iran, we are left with what the documentation made available to the Agency describes. This includes:
• Work to design and develop an exploding bridge wire detonator and firing unit, including testing of "at least one full scale hemispherical, converging, explosively driven shock system that could be applicable to an implosion-type nuclear device;"
• "Efforts to engineer a new payload chamber for the Shahab-3 missile re-entry vehicle," which the IAEA described in its February 2008 report as "quite likely to be able to accommodate a nuclear device;" and,
• Work to develop a capability to convert uranium dioxide into uranium tetrafluoride (a precursor to uranium hexafluoride, the feed material for gas centrifuges) additional to the established uranium conversion facility at Esfahan.
The IAEA’s report makes clear that these activities also involved clandestine procurement efforts, including those conducted by military-affiliated institutions and personnel in a manner designed, by Iran’s own admission, to avoid international sanctions. The IAEA has also described in detail previously Iran’s interactions with the A. Q. Khan network and the inconsistencies and gaps between the information provided by the network and that provided by Iran. These interactions resulted in Iran’s acquisition of a document describing the casting of uranium metal into hemispheres, for which the only plausible use is nuclear weapons. As Deputy Director General Heinonen noted in his technical briefing last week, Iran’s failure to provide a substantive explanation for this document and the manner in which it was obtained remains an open question.
Even if these were disparate projects, given the context of these activities, the secrecy with which they were pursued, and Iran’s persistent refusal to explain them, it is difficult to arrive at a legitimate purpose for such work. However, we also know that these activities shared administrative interconnections and, taken in combination, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Iran engaged in a dedicated effort to bring together several various aspects of nuclear weapons development in order to acquire such arms. It is for this reason that we echo the Director General’s clear call for Iranian transparency and full disclosure and agree that it is "essential that Iran provide all requested information, clarifications, and access outlined in this report without further delay." This is not only a request from the Director General, but an obligation on Iran established by the Security Council when it decided in its Resolution 1737 that "Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA requests to be able to verify [Iran’s] suspension…and to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports…"
Mr. Chairman,
This Board has acted when necessary to address our collective concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program. In September 2005, the Board found Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations. We did not immediately report Iran to the Security Council in order to give Iran the opportunity to build confidence by changing its confrontational course and returning to suspension; Iran responded by restarting its centrifuge program at Natanz. The Board again acted in February 2006, by reporting Iran’s noncompliance with its safeguards obligations and questions that had arisen within the competence of the Security Council, as the international organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.
There has been some progress in clarifying outstanding issues over the past few years. However, this progress is undermined by the existence of troubling questions about weapons-related work and the connections this work had to Iran’s nuclear program. Combined with Iran’s failure to take the confidence-building measures required by the Security Council and this Board, we have no choice than to remain seized with the matter of Iran’s nuclear program. This investigation is essential – especially in light of indications of a hidden weapons program – to ensure that there is no nuclear material being used for weapons purposes. It is warranted because of the IAEA’s mandate pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement with Iran and the requests of the UN Security Council.
Mr. Chairman,
Iran has not made this easy. Each step along the way, Iran has denied the IAEA essential information and answers to queries. It has done so in a manner entirely inconsistent with a state claiming to be in full compliance with its international obligations. The IAEA’s recent observation that Iran has failed to act in accordance with Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to its Safeguards Agreement is a case in point. Iran has failed to provide in a timely manner revised design information regarding the installation and operation of centrifuges at Natanz. We reiterate our call for Iran to acknowledge its obligations under Code 3.1 and immediately adhere to its safeguards obligations, including declaring any activities that fall under the requirements of Code 3.1.
Iran’s expanding installation and operation of centrifuges at Natanz is also part of Iran’s failure to comply with the legally-binding requirements of the UN Security Council. Iran’s efforts to develop advanced gas centrifuge designs compounds our concerns and Iran’s noncompliance, as does Iran’s continued construction of a heavy water research reactor at Arak. Iran’s failure to suspend its uranium enrichment- and heavy water-related activities as required by now three Chapter VII UNSC resolutions demonstrates its blatant disregard of world concerns. And, as we know, producing fissile material -- whether highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium -- is the most difficult and time-consuming aspect of a nuclear weapon program. Iran continues this work apace while it stalls the IAEA with non-answers and obfuscation. Every passing day leads Iran closer to mastering the technology it needs to build a weapon.
Mr. Chairman,
Speaking Tuesday in Washington, Secretary Rice posed several questions on Iran that are relevant to us here in Vienna: "Why has Iran rejected, thus far, Russia’s offer of uranium enrichment in Russia? Why, as the IAEA’s most recent report shows, is Iran continuing to enrich uranium in violation of UN Security Council resolutions? Why, as the IAEA also suggests, are parts of Iran’s nuclear program under the control of the Iranian military? And why is Iran continuing to deny international experts full access to its nuclear facilities? … It’s just hard to imagine that there are innocent answers to these questions."
The United Nations has responded appropriately to Iran’s failure to meet its international nuclear obligations through the adoption of four resolutions by the UN Security Council, three imposing legally binding, Chapter VII sanctions. The Council’s actions do not undermine our search for a diplomatic solution, which we strongly favor. Instead, as part of our dual-track strategy of offering negotiations and increasing pressure, we continue to present Iran’s leaders with a path forward that would provide both the nation and people of Iran with the international respect, civil nuclear technology, and economic benefits, that they deserve.
It is for that reason that Dr. Javier Solana, on behalf of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, will convey in the near term to Iran an updated version of the package of incentives originally offered in June 2006. This package represents our commitment to resolving this issue through negotiations and diplomacy. Moreover, we welcome a dialogue with Iran during negotiations, which Iran can initiate through verified suspension of uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.
Our ultimate objective is Iran’s establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Such confidence can only come through Iran’s complete cooperation with the IAEA, full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and the suspension required by the UN Security Council. Otherwise, the IAEA will remain unable to resolve its "serious concerns" about activities with possible military dimensions or provide any assurance as to the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran.
If the Iranian government has indeed stopped its pursuit of nuclear weapons and has no intention of restarting such an effort, it is best served by admitting past work and allowing the IAEA to verify that it has stopped, as other countries have done. Threats to limit cooperation with the IAEA undermine Iran’s argument that it has nothing to hide.
The strategic decision to abandon forever the pursuit of nuclear weapons is Iran’s alone. Until then, the IAEA Board of Governors, the UN Security Council, and individual Member States must continue to do their duty to hold Iran to its nonproliferation obligations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
