Embassy of the United States

speeches

Statement of the United States of America on agenda 8(b): Report by the Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards in the Democratic People%u2019s Republic of Korea

MR. CHAIRMAN,

AS WE ALL KNOW, NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS ARE A LONGSTANDING THREAT TO REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME.  THE 1994 AGREED FRAMEWORK SET OUT TO ADDRESS THAT THREAT, INCLUDING THE INCONSISTENCIES FOUND BY THE IAEA IN NORTH KOREA’S ORIGINAL DECLARATION UNDER ITS NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE AGENCY.  UNDER THE AGREED FRAMEWORK, NORTH KOREA COMMITTED NOT TO PRODUCE FISSILE MATERIAL AT ITS DECLARED NUCLEAR FACILITIES AT YONGBYON; AND THE AGREED FRAMEWORK’S PREFACE STATED THAT ITS PURPOSE WAS “AN OVERALL RESOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.” 

THE AGREED FRAMEWORK DID NOT, AS WE LEARNED LATER, END THE NORTH’S NUCLEAR ARMS PROGRAMS.  BY THE FALL OF 2002, WE ASSESSED THAT NORTH KOREA WAS PURSUING A COVERT PROGRAM TO PRODUCE ENRICHED URANIUM AND HAD BEEN PURSUING IT FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS.  WHEN CONFRONTED WITH OUR ASSESSMENT, THE DPRK, INSTEAD OF TAKING THE OPPORTUNITY WE AFFORDED IT TO BEGIN WALKING BACK ITS COVERT URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROGRAM, ESCALATED THE SITUATION. 

IN ADDITION, IF THE DPRK HAS FINISHED REPROCESSING ITS APPROXIMATELY 8,000 EXISTING SPENT FUEL RODS, AS IT HAS DECLARED, IT COULD HAVE PRODUCED ENOUGH FISSILE MATERIAL FOR SEVERAL ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

THE UNITED STATES HAS ADHERED TO TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES TO RESOLVE THE THREAT POSED BY THE DPRK’S PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.  FIRST, WE SEEK A RESOLUTION TO THE ISSUE IN A PERMANENT, TRANSPARENT, AND THOROUGH MANNER, SUBJECT TO EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.  WE WILL NOT ACCEPT A PARTIAL SOLUTION THAT DOES NOT DEAL WITH THE ENTIRETY OF THE PROBLEM, ALLOWING NORTH KOREA TO THREATEN OTHERS CONTINUALLY WITH A REVIVAL OF ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM.  SECOND, BECAUSE THE DPRK’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS THREATEN ITS NEIGHBORS AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, WE BELIEVE THAT A MULTILATERAL SOLUTION IS NEEDED TO TRULY ADDRESS THE PROBLEM.  WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM THROUGH MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY AND VIEW THE SIX-PARTY TALKS AS THE BEST FORUM AT THIS TIME.

WE HAVE MADE PROGRESS OVER THE LAST YEAR AND A HALF BY GETTING ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SIX-PARTY TALKS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE MUTUAL GOAL IS THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA.  THE SIX PARTIES HELD A WORKING GROUP JUNE 21-22 AND A THIRD PLENARY SESSION JUNE 23-26.  AT THE PLENARY, ALL OF THE PARTIES PUT FORWARD CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS; AND THE UNITED STATES, THE ROK AND THE DPRK PRESENTED PROPOSALS.

UNDER THE U.S. PROPOSAL, DEVELOPED IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND JAPAN, THE DPRK WOULD, AS A FIRST STEP, COMMIT TO DISMANTLE ALL OF ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAMS.  THE PARTIES WOULD THEN REACH AGREEMENT ON A DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN REQUIRING, AT A MINIMUM, THE SUPERVISED DISABLING, DISMANTLEMENT AND ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR-RELATED FACILITIES AND MATERIAL; THE REMOVAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WEAPONS COMPONENTS, CENTRIFUGE AND OTHER NUCLEAR PARTS, FISSILE MATERIAL AND FUEL RODS; AND A LONG-TERM MONITORING PROGRAM.  DISMANTLEMENT WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE THE DPRK’S URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROGRAM, WHICH IT CONTINUES TO DENY EXISTS, DESPITE ITS EARLIER ADMISSION OF SUCH A PROGRAM IN OCTOBER 2002 AND REPORTS OF A.Q. KHAN'S ACTIVITIES.

UNDER THE U.S. PROPOSAL, AN INITIAL PREPARATORY PERIOD OF A THREE-MONTH DURATION, WHEREIN THE DPRK WOULD TAKE CERTAIN STEPS TO SECURE AND DISABLE ELEMENTS OF ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAMS, WOULD ALSO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY TIME TO PREPARE FOR FULL DISMANTLEMENT AND REMOVAL, SUBJECT TO EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.  UPON DPRK ACCEPTANCE OF THE OVERALL APPROACH, NON-U.S. PARTIES WOULD BEGIN PROVISION OF HEAVY FUEL OIL.  UPON ACCEPTANCE OF THE NORTH’S INITIAL DECLARATION OF ALL NUCLEAR PROGRAMS, MATERIALS AND FACILITIES, INCLUDING ALL URANIUM ENRICHMENT ACTIVITIES, THE OTHER PARTIES WOULD PROVIDE CERTAIN OTHER CORRESPONDING MEASURES, INCLUDING PROVISIONAL MULTILATERAL SECURITY ASSURANCES. 

THE DPRK’S PROPOSAL RESTATED ITS GOAL OF A FREEZE FOR REWARDS, INCLUDING ENERGY ASSISTANCE, LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, AND REMOVAL FROM THE U.S. LIST OF STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM.  ITS PROPOSAL IGNORED URANIUM ENRICHMENT, PLUTONIUM SEPARATED BEFORE 2003, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.  WE AND THE OTHER FOUR PARTIES HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DPRK PROPOSAL, INCLUDING WHAT THE SCOPE OF THE FREEZE AND DISMANTLEMENT WOULD BE.  WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK ANSWERS THROUGH THE SIX-PARTY PROCESS.

WE HAVE SAID MANY TIMES THAT WE WANT TO HELP THE DPRK TO REJOIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, ENHANCE ITS SECURITY AND PROMOTE THE WELL-BEING OF ITS CITIZENS.  BUT, THIS PROCESS HAS TO BEGIN WITH THE DPRK REMOVING THIS THREAT TO THE REGION, THIS DANGER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.  THE SIX-PARTY TALKS OFFER THE DPRK THE OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, THE ROK AND OTHER COUNTRIES, TO END ITS SELF-INDUCED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISOLATION, AND TO REAP THE BENEFITS OF NORMAL INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND AID.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

WE WELCOME THE SECRETARIAT'S STATED WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH ALL PARTIES TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION OF THE ISSUE.  WE SUPPORT THE REPEATED CALLS BY THE BOARD AND THE GENERAL CONFERENCE FOR THE DPRK TO RETURN TO THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME AND PERMIT THE APPLICATION OF COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS.  IN SO DOING, THE DPRK WOULD COME A LONG WAY IN REMOVING THE GRAVE CONCERNS OF SO MANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

THE U.S. FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT DIPLOMACY IS THE BEST WAY TO OVERCOME THE DPRK’S NUCLEAR THREAT, WHICH IS WHY ARE ENGAGED IN THE SIX-PARTY TALKS.  GIVEN THE HISTORY OF THE DPRK’S BROKEN COMMITMENTS AND OBLIGATIONS, OUR AIM IS TO FULLY AND FINALLY RESOLVE THE DPRK NUCLEAR PROBLEM, NOT TO IMPLEMENT HALF MEASURES OR SWEEP THE PROBLEM UNDER THE RUG FOR FUTURE POLICY MAKERS TO DEAL WITH.  WE ARE PURSUING THIS COURSE PATIENTLY AND ARE COMMITTED TO ITS SUCCESS.  WE HOPE THE DPRK HAS MADE THE SAME COMMITMENT. 

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.