Embassy of the United States

MR. CHAIRMAN,

AS WE ALL KNOW, NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS ARE A LONGSTANDING THREAT TO REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME.  THE 1994 AGREED FRAMEWORK SET OUT TO ADDRESS THAT THREAT, INCLUDING THE INCONSISTENCIES FOUND BY THE IAEA IN NORTH KOREA’S ORIGINAL DECLARATION UNDER ITS NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE AGENCY.  UNDER THE AGREED FRAMEWORK, NORTH KOREA COMMITTED NOT TO PRODUCE FISSILE MATERIAL AT ITS DECLARED NUCLEAR FACILITIES AT YONGBYON; AND THE AGREED FRAMEWORK’S PREFACE STATED THAT ITS PURPOSE WAS “AN OVERALL RESOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.”  

THE AGREED FRAMEWORK DID NOT, AS WE LEARNED LATER, END THE NORTH’S NUCLEAR ARMS PROGRAMS.  BY THE FALL OF 2002, WE ASSESSED THAT NORTH KOREA WAS PURSUING A COVERT PROGRAM TO PRODUCE ENRICHED URANIUM AND HAD BEEN PURSUING IT FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS.  WHEN CONFRONTED WITH OUR ASSESSMENT, THE DPRK, INSTEAD OF TAKING THE OPPORTUNITY WE AFFORDED IT TO BEGIN WALKING BACK ITS COVERT URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROGRAM, ESCALATED THE SITUATION.  

IN ADDITION, IF THE DPRK HAS FINISHED REPROCESSING ITS APPROXIMATELY 8,000 EXISTING SPENT FUEL RODS, AS IT HAS DECLARED, IT COULD HAVE PRODUCED ENOUGH FISSILE MATERIAL FOR SEVERAL ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

THE UNITED STATES HAS ADHERED TO TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES TO RESOLVE THE THREAT POSED BY THE DPRK’S PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.  FIRST, WE SEEK A RESOLUTION TO THE ISSUE IN A PERMANENT, TRANSPARENT, AND THOROUGH MANNER, SUBJECT TO EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.  WE WILL NOT ACCEPT A PARTIAL SOLUTION THAT DOES NOT DEAL WITH THE ENTIRETY OF THE PROBLEM, ALLOWING NORTH KOREA TO THREATEN OTHERS CONTINUALLY WITH A REVIVAL OF ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM.  SECOND, BECAUSE THE DPRK’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS THREATEN ITS NEIGHBORS AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, WE BELIEVE THAT A MULTILATERAL SOLUTION IS NEEDED TO TRULY ADDRESS THE PROBLEM.  WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM THROUGH MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY AND VIEW THE SIX-PARTY TALKS AS THE BEST FORUM AT THIS TIME.

WE HAVE MADE PROGRESS OVER THE LAST YEAR AND A HALF BY GETTING ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SIX-PARTY TALKS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE MUTUAL GOAL IS THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA.  THE SIX PARTIES HELD A WORKING GROUP JUNE 21-22 AND A THIRD PLENARY SESSION JUNE 23-26.  AT THE PLENARY, ALL OF THE PARTIES PUT FORWARD CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS; AND THE UNITED STATES, THE ROK AND THE DPRK PRESENTED PROPOSALS.

UNDER THE U.S. PROPOSAL, DEVELOPED IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND JAPAN, THE DPRK WOULD, AS A FIRST STEP, COMMIT TO DISMANTLE ALL OF ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAMS.  THE PARTIES WOULD THEN REACH AGREEMENT ON A DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN REQUIRING, AT A MINIMUM, THE SUPERVISED DISABLING, DISMANTLEMENT AND ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR-RELATED FACILITIES AND MATERIAL; THE REMOVAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WEAPONS COMPONENTS, CENTRIFUGE AND OTHER NUCLEAR PARTS, FISSILE MATERIAL AND FUEL RODS; AND A LONG-TERM MONITORING PROGRAM.  DISMANTLEMENT WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE THE DPRK’S URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROGRAM, WHICH IT CONTINUES TO DENY EXISTS, DESPITE ITS EARLIER ADMISSION OF SUCH A PROGRAM IN OCTOBER 2002 AND REPORTS OF A.Q. KHAN'S ACTIVITIES.

UNDER THE U.S. PROPOSAL, AN INITIAL PREPARATORY PERIOD OF A THREE-MONTH DURATION, WHEREIN THE DPRK WOULD TAKE CERTAIN STEPS TO SECURE AND DISABLE ELEMENTS OF ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAMS, WOULD ALSO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY TIME TO PREPARE FOR FULL DISMANTLEMENT AND REMOVAL, SUBJECT TO EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.  UPON DPRK ACCEPTANCE OF THE OVERALL APPROACH, NON-U.S. PARTIES WOULD BEGIN PROVISION OF HEAVY FUEL OIL.  UPON ACCEPTANCE OF THE NORTH’S INITIAL DECLARATION OF ALL NUCLEAR PROGRAMS, MATERIALS AND FACILITIES, INCLUDING ALL URANIUM ENRICHMENT ACTIVITIES, THE OTHER PARTIES WOULD PROVIDE CERTAIN OTHER CORRESPONDING MEASURES, INCLUDING PROVISIONAL MULTILATERAL SECURITY ASSURANCES.  

THE DPRK’S PROPOSAL RESTATED ITS GOAL OF A FREEZE FOR REWARDS, INCLUDING ENERGY ASSISTANCE, LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, AND REMOVAL FROM THE U.S. LIST OF STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM.  ITS PROPOSAL IGNORED URANIUM ENRICHMENT, PLUTONIUM SEPARATED BEFORE 2003, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.  WE AND THE OTHER FOUR PARTIES HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DPRK PROPOSAL, INCLUDING WHAT THE SCOPE OF THE FREEZE AND DISMANTLEMENT WOULD BE.  WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK ANSWERS THROUGH THE SIX-PARTY PROCESS.

WE HAVE SAID MANY TIMES THAT WE WANT TO HELP THE DPRK TO REJOIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, ENHANCE ITS SECURITY AND PROMOTE THE WELL-BEING OF ITS CITIZENS.  BUT, THIS PROCESS HAS TO BEGIN WITH THE DPRK REMOVING THIS THREAT TO THE REGION, THIS DANGER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.  THE SIX-PARTY TALKS OFFER THE DPRK THE OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, THE ROK AND OTHER COUNTRIES, TO END ITS SELF-INDUCED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISOLATION, AND TO REAP THE BENEFITS OF NORMAL INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND AID.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

WE WELCOME THE SECRETARIAT'S STATED WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH ALL PARTIES TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION OF THE ISSUE.  WE SUPPORT THE REPEATED CALLS BY THE BOARD AND THE GENERAL CONFERENCE FOR THE DPRK TO RETURN TO THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME AND PERMIT THE APPLICATION OF COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS.  IN SO DOING, THE DPRK WOULD COME A LONG WAY IN REMOVING THE GRAVE CONCERNS OF SO MANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

THE U.S. FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT DIPLOMACY IS THE BEST WAY TO OVERCOME THE DPRK’S NUCLEAR THREAT, WHICH IS WHY ARE ENGAGED IN THE SIX-PARTY TALKS.  GIVEN THE HISTORY OF THE DPRK’S BROKEN COMMITMENTS AND OBLIGATIONS, OUR AIM IS TO FULLY AND FINALLY RESOLVE THE DPRK NUCLEAR PROBLEM, NOT TO IMPLEMENT HALF MEASURES OR SWEEP THE PROBLEM UNDER THE RUG FOR FUTURE POLICY MAKERS TO DEAL WITH.  WE ARE PURSUING THIS COURSE PATIENTLY AND ARE COMMITTED TO ITS SUCCESS.  WE HOPE THE DPRK HAS MADE THE SAME COMMITMENT.  

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.
Mr. Chairman,

I first want to thank the Director General and the IAEA Safeguards Directorate for the IAEA's sustained, ongoing efforts in Iran and for the September 1 report, as well as for the technical briefing offered to missions last week and the DG's introductory statement to the Board on Monday.  The IAEA's work has provided a sound basis of verified facts to help the Board objectively consider this important agenda item.

The United States welcomes the Board's action today in adopting a resolution that makes clear to Iran that the Board, representing the broader international community, has exhausted its patience with Iran's continuing refusal to meet its commitments, to comply with Board resolution requests, and to cooperate fully with the IAEA.  The United States considers the adoption of this resolution to be a clear victory in support of the IAEA safeguards system.

Iran should not underestimate the Board's resolve to do what is necessary in November.  As Board members, we must not delay beyond November the fulfillment of our responsibilities, nor allow Iran to manipulate the Board's will or undermine our commitment to address effectively this threat to the safeguards system.  We hope Iran heeds today's warning from the Board, by taking all necessary steps immediately to comply with the Board's calls, as embodied not only in this resolution, but in the Board's past four resolutions.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Board, we will face an important decision at our November Board meeting, one that will require both the fullest possible understanding of Iran's nuclear activities, and the strongest possible commitment on our part to implementing the NPT and upholding the requirements of the IAEA Statute.

To achieve the fullest possible understanding of Iran's past and current nuclear program will require, of course, further work on the part of the DG and his able staff.   That is why the Board's resolution requested of Dr. ElBaradei in such specific terms a comprehensive report on Iran before the next Board.  The past six reports from Dr. ElBaradei over the past 18 months have provided us with an examination of a member state's troubling nuclear history unprecedented in its scope and detail.  We welcome the Secretariat's outstanding work and dedication to conduct this investigation and to produce those reports.  But rather than continue the pattern of episodic reporting covering distinct three-month periods, which can unintentionally fail to convey the full scope of the IAEA's overall findings, we welcome this resolution's requirement for a comprehensive report.  We believe such report must describe clearly and in comprehensive detail for Board members:

• The full range of safeguards failures, breaches, and inconsistencies confirmed by the IAEA from the beginning of its investigation, including information on the dates of Iran's past nuclear activities together with the dates those activities were declared by Iran, and a summary of the IAEA's verification efforts related to Iran's safeguards obligations;
• The current status of Iran's progress in all areas of its nuclear program, including all of its nuclear fuel- cycle related efforts, from uranium mining and milling to ore processing to conversion efforts, to enrichment using gas centrifuges and lasers, to heavy water production and heavy water reactor efforts and plutonium separation work, to experiments with polonium-210, including remaining gaps in the Agency's understanding of these programs;
• A full history of Iran's cooperation with the Agency's ongoing investigation, including an assessment of the timeliness and scope of Iran's responses to the IAEA's requests for information and access, a chronology of Iran's record regarding granting IAEA access requested sites, specific identification of any sites requested by the Agency that it has not yet been allowed to visit, and a full accounting of any delays the IAEA encountered in gaining access to any sites;
• A summary of Iran's declarations submitted to the Agency in October 2003 and May 2004 in accordance with the Additional Protocol, and the status of the IAEA's ongoing assessment of the correctness and completeness of those declarations; and
• The extent of Iran's compliance with past Board resolution requests, including the Board's
  

requests for full suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including commitments related to production of feedstock materials, to refrain from uranium conversion operations, and to reconsider plans to proceed with construction of a heavy water-moderated reactor and associated facilities.

Moreover, Mr. Chairman, there remain a number of unanswered questions that continue to concern us, drawn directly from the DG's reporting.  We would hope that the DG's next report would offer explicit answers to questions like the following:

• What is the full scope of the P2 centrifuge program, including what Iran did between 1995 and 2002?
• What is Iran's explanation for refusing to suspend its uranium conversion work?  What is the stated goal of the 37-ton yellowcake conversion planned this month at the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)?  Is the goal to generate UF6?  What does Iran intend to do with the final product?
• What are the possible origins of the enriched uranium particles found on centrifuges and centrifuge equipment in Iran?  What are the possible origins of the UF6 particles found at the Tehran Research Reactor?
• What are the remaining gaps in Iran's reporting of its past experiments to separate plutonium, including how recently it conducted those experiments?
• Are Iran's explanations for its efforts to produce Polonium-210 credible?  Did Iran perform nuclear-related work with Beryllium (which when combined with Po-210 forms a neutron initiator that could be used in nuclear weapons)?
• Why is the Iranian government not seeking ratification of the Additional Protocol?
• What explanation did Iran provide regarding the need to use sophisticated "whole body counters" to conduct supposedly basic nuclear-defense work at the sanitized "Lavizan" site?  Was this explanation credible?  What specific "nuclear defense" projects were pursued at that site?
• Was the existence of the "Bandar Abbas uranium mine and production plant at Gachin" reported to the Agency in October 2003?  Is there a military link to this mine?  What is the extent of the Iranian military's role in Iran's nuclear activities?
• The IAEA is continuing to investigate Iranian attempts to procure "dual use equipment and materials which have applications in the conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well as in the nuclear military area."
  

What specific types of equipment was Iran attempting to procure?

• Are there other locations or facilities in Iran that the IAEA has requested access to or seeks to visit?  What role do hot cells play in Iran's nuclear program?  What are the specifications of hot cell technology Iran has attempted to procure?
• What specific steps, including any site visits, has the IAEA taken to verify the absence of nuclear weapons design-related work?
• When did the IAEA first request to visit the high explosive test facility at Parchin, what are the nature of the IAEA's concerns with regard to possible nuclear- related testing there, and what has been Iran's response to the IAEA?
  

Mr. Chairman, it is critical that we remind ourselves and our leaders of what is at stake here, and of what our responsibilities as IAEA Board members require of us.  Much of the international debate on how to deal with Iran's nuclear program has focused on whether Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons.  As we have made clear many times, the United States believes Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, but many question this assertion.

Unfortunately, this debate has distracted attention from the clear facts that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement, an agreement that is required under Article III of the NPT.  Mr. Chairman, that fact alone is sufficient cause for action.  The NPT and the IAEA safeguards system were set up to provide early warning of diversion of nuclear material, recognizing that ostensibly civil nuclear programs could be a means for proliferators to develop the fissile material production capabilities that could then be used clandestinely to produce nuclear material for weapons by violating safeguards or openly after breakout from the NPT.  If you wait until the IAEA finds the nuclear weapons - or an unambiguous nuclear weapons program - it may already be too late.

Iran long ago crossed the tripwire IAEA safeguards provide.  The fact that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement is all the evidence the Board needs to act.  We should not impose a higher standard than that set in the statute by requiring the IAEA to prove these violations were to produce nuclear weapons or require the IAEA to resolve every issue.  It is the fact of dedicated Iranian safeguards obfuscation, over the course of two decades, that triggers the Board's responsibility to report and that same fact provides the best indicator of Iranian intent.

This early warning system works in two ways.  Most obviously, the IAEA may detect the diversion of nuclear material from declared peaceful uses by discovering actual diversion to weapons.  But equally important, early warning is provided when the IAEA identifies failures to cooperate with safeguards implementation, countries that file false information, fail to report required information and operate their nuclear programs in a clandestine manner hidden from the IAEA.  Such actions require a response by the Board.  As a result of such actions, the IAEA may be unable to verify non-diversion even though it may not be able to establish actual diversion.  In effect, safeguards are designed to require cooperation and non-cooperation can constitute non-compliance.  The strengthened safeguards system and the Additional Protocol were designed to improve this early warning capability, by making it harder to appear to cooperate while hiding certain activities.  If we, the Board, overlook the actions that a country takes in breach of its safeguards obligations, and its failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA, we are rendering this early warning system irrelevant, to our own peril.

Mr. Chairman, there must be consequences for states that willfully violate their safeguards agreements, especially when the State involved has more often impeded than assisted the subsequent IAEA investigation.  When a state violates its safeguards obligations systematically, over an extended period of time, pursuing in secret sensitive nuclear fuel cycle programs that could contribute to a nuclear weapons capability, the international response must be particularly resolute.  Such unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities must be terminated.

Some might argue that the Board is overreaching in seeking to require Iran to suspend its sensitive fuel cycle activities.  However, the Board's task is to make determinations on whether Iran is complying with its commitment that safegauds are being applied to all source or special nuclear material so that the Agency can verify "that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Given what we know about the Iranian program, their safeguards violations, their grudging cooperation with Agency inspectors and their current lack of an in-force Additional Protocol, can any Board member truly believe we are in a position to certify that material is not being diverted to a nuclear weapons program? Iranian operation of sensitive nuclear facilities will only make this inability to verify more severe.  The Board's decision to defer reporting Iran's extensive safeguards violations in November 2003 was in large part based on the premise that Iran had made a genuine commitment to suspend its sensitive fuel cycle activities thereby providing the Board with some assurance that it would be in a position to make this essential judgment about Iran's compliance with its safeguards obligations.

This decision in November 2003 to defer reporting Iran's confirmed safeguards violations to the Security Council was motivated by the desire to give Iran the opportunity to build international confidence through suspension of its fuel cycle activities.  Iran took full advantage of that opportunity - not to build the necessary confidence, but to cynically avoid Board action as Iran advanced ever closer towards self-sufficiency in its conversion and enrichment programs.  Iran has made clear repeatedly and explicitly that it has no intention of ever giving up its fuel cycle pursuits, despite their clandestine origins and the absence of any justification for Iran to seek such technology for nuclear power.  Indeed, in just the recent months since the June BOG meeting:

•   Ambassador Moussavian, here today with us, was quoted in the Financial Times this week saying:  "The reason the Europeans are asking us to continue the suspension is that they want cessation, and this will never happen."
• Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Asefi was quoted last weekend in the London Times asserting that Iran would never accept any limitations on its right to master "peaceful" nuclear technology.  As he said: "That is out of the question because we have already reached that point."
• Expediency Council Chairman Rafsanjani, on June 30, warned that: "We hope the Westerners are not going to do something which will bring us to the point where we will decide that we have to withdraw from the NPT.  We will continue our programs right to their very end."
• Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi stated on June 12, 2004 that Iran wanted to be considered a member of the nuclear club.
• Secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security Hassan Ruhani said at a June 20 press conference that "The issue of the fuel cycle will not under any circumstances be halted, and its suspension is voluntary and short- term.  "Ruhani added to that when speaking to reporters on September 8, saying: "The fuel cycle must remain within Iran's access.  We won't give up this objective, and we will try to pursue this goal at the most appropriate time and with the best shape."
• President Khatami, speaking to reporters on July 14, said: "The enrichment of uranium is our legal, international, and natural right and it is in keeping with our national pride.  It is not possible to give up that right."
• Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei warned the international community on June 21 that "the Iranian nation will not cave in to your demands.  What Iranian researchers are doing in the field of nuclear activities and technology is a huge task which must be accomplished.  It is our national duty to seek this."
  

Members of the Board, with every passing week, Iran becomes that much closer to reaching the point where neither we, nor any other international body, will be able to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weapons capability.  It is not too late to resolve this issue through peaceful diplomatic means, and the United States is committed to seeking such a resolution.  But the time for decisive action is upon us.  The Board must act in November to show Iran that the world stands resolute against Iran's longstanding and serious safeguards violations, including by making a report to the UN Security Council.  The Council is the appropriate body to address Iran's fuel cycle activities and, as a matter impacting on international peace and security, add gravity and imperative to this Boards many previous requests to Iran that it finally come clean and step away from its nuclear weapons aspirations.

I should remind the Board that in 1991, following, revelations about Iraq's secret nuclear weapons program, then Director General Blix drew three key lessons about the steps needed to strengthen the safeguards system.  Dr. Blix said that the IAEA needed access to information, physical access in country, and access to the Security Council.  Let us not forget these lessons.  Thank you.