IAEA Board of Governors Meeting,
November 21, 2003
Mr. Chairman,
I would like to take this opportunity to comment briefly on two matters raised by the Director General in his opening remarks, two matters of importance to my government: visas and the Director General’s proposals for international controls on production of nuclear material.
First, on visas. The State Department issued 5.7 million non-immigrant visas from October 1, 2002 to September 30, 2003. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. Government agencies have engaged in an extensive and ongoing review of visa issuing practices as they relate to the security of our borders. When the Department of Homeland Security was created by Congress, that Department became responsible for visa policy. New security measures have strained implementation of our procedures. However, progress has been made in reducing backlogs through improved automation and inter-agency cooperation. I apologize for the inconvenience caused to official visitors from the IAEA, but under the circumstances we must ask for your patience.
The best course of action is for prospective visitors to apply for their visas as early as possible, to give us as much time as possible to process their applications. The Secretariat may also wish to consider building additional lead-time into its programs requiring travel to the United States, to reduce the risk that visa processing delays will inconvenience any travelers.
Mr. Chairman,
Secondly, I would like to comment on the Director General’s proposal for multinational control of uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, in order to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Such facilities can produce high enriched uranium and plutonium, which are usable in nuclear weapons. He has also provided some other ideas.
Concern that enrichment and reprocessing have potential military as well as civilian purposes is long-standing. For that reason, the United States and other supplier countries have export policies in place that limit or deny assistance to other countries in these areas of the fuel cycle. We are working hard to strengthen the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime. Measures that address the threat of enrichment and reprocessing in NPT states of proliferation concern are high on our agenda.
I would note that multinational control of enrichment and reprocessing in Iran and the DPRK would not be a solution to the nuclear proliferation risk posed by those two countries. Their activities have no conceivable justification except to have the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Mr. Chairman,
The United States welcomes the Director General’s contribution to this debate and encourages him to continue to speak out.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
November 21, 2003
Mr. Chairman,
I would like to take this opportunity to comment briefly on two matters raised by the Director General in his opening remarks, two matters of importance to my government: visas and the Director General’s proposals for international controls on production of nuclear material.
First, on visas. The State Department issued 5.7 million non-immigrant visas from October 1, 2002 to September 30, 2003. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. Government agencies have engaged in an extensive and ongoing review of visa issuing practices as they relate to the security of our borders. When the Department of Homeland Security was created by Congress, that Department became responsible for visa policy. New security measures have strained implementation of our procedures. However, progress has been made in reducing backlogs through improved automation and inter-agency cooperation. I apologize for the inconvenience caused to official visitors from the IAEA, but under the circumstances we must ask for your patience.
The best course of action is for prospective visitors to apply for their visas as early as possible, to give us as much time as possible to process their applications. The Secretariat may also wish to consider building additional lead-time into its programs requiring travel to the United States, to reduce the risk that visa processing delays will inconvenience any travelers.
Mr. Chairman,
Secondly, I would like to comment on the Director General’s proposal for multinational control of uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, in order to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Such facilities can produce high enriched uranium and plutonium, which are usable in nuclear weapons. He has also provided some other ideas.
Concern that enrichment and reprocessing have potential military as well as civilian purposes is long-standing. For that reason, the United States and other supplier countries have export policies in place that limit or deny assistance to other countries in these areas of the fuel cycle. We are working hard to strengthen the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime. Measures that address the threat of enrichment and reprocessing in NPT states of proliferation concern are high on our agenda.
I would note that multinational control of enrichment and reprocessing in Iran and the DPRK would not be a solution to the nuclear proliferation risk posed by those two countries. Their activities have no conceivable justification except to have the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Mr. Chairman,
The United States welcomes the Director General’s contribution to this debate and encourages him to continue to speak out.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.