Statement by the United States of America on agenda item 8: Creation of a Special Committee on Safeguards and Verification
Madam Chair,
Thank you for this opportunity to describe the current status of the proposal to create a special committee of the Board on Safeguards and Verification.
During each major meeting of the Board of Governors last year, the United States discussed its proposal to create a Special Committee of the Board on Safeguards and Verification. Looking back, it is clear that our original proposal for this new Committee has undergone significant changes. These changes were derived largely from the considered input and ideas of our fellow Board members.
We have had useful discussions in the past weeks and again on the margins of this Board meeting. Some states noted redundancies in our earlier proposal and we have tried to streamline our proposal; others made excellent points about why it would be inappropriate to consider specific topics, and we have deleted some elements. Still others pointed out that we overlooked certain subjects the Committee should study, and we responded by adding some suggestions. We appreciate the seriousness of these constructive suggestions.
Some of our colleagues have asked us to provide a detailed rationale explaining why it is imperative for the international community to create such a Committee. These colleagues have also asked us to describe how our objectives for the Committee fulfil these needs. I would like to address these issues now.
As everyone in this boardroom realizes, matters related to safeguards and verification have occupied a considerable amount of this Board’s work during the past two to three years. Besides addressing such serious matters, the IAEA also has to deal with a new threat – a covert nuclear supply network. Moreover, during this period of time, one state announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and is boldly developing nuclear weapons. These challenges are too big, too diverse, and too difficult for any one state to manage alone. Much like this Board pulled together in Programme 93 +2 and Committee 24 to address the ambitious, covert nuclear weapons program pursued by the former regime in Iraq, we must now combine our talents to combat and defeat this scourge of proliferation. By focusing our work in the Special Committee, we hope to be able to develop measures that will enhance the IAEA’s capabilities to detect, deter, and prevent nuclear proliferation.
To this end, the revised draft terms of reference that has been circulated by the Secretariat offers a much-improved proposal for the work of the Special Committee. We have, for example, modified our position on membership. We can agree that the Committee shall be open ended. This position, however, is without prejudice to our other proposal on membership that we will submit for consideration by the Special Committee, i.e., that countries under investigation for non-technical violations of their nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards obligations should elect not to participate in discussions by the Board or the Special Committee regarding their own cases.
The United States would classify the mission of the proposed Special Committee into two broad clusters. The first would be to serve as a forum for handling routine safeguards-related issues. Into this category, we would include matters related to the review of the annual Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR), and to the studies undertaken by the Agency and member states to achieve universal adherence to Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols. Under this mission, the Committee could review past agency actions to ascertain ways to strengthen the safeguards system; it could begin with Program 93+2 to determine the extent to which these enhanced measures have been fully implemented by the Agency, and assess whether those measures have proven to be effective and cost efficient. In addressing such issues, the Committee would have a role similar to those played by the Program and Budget Committee and the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee, and, like these Committees, the proposed Special Committee on Safeguards would not have authority to interfere with the day-to-day management of the Department of Safeguards.
As envisaged, the second general mission of the Committee would be forward-looking in nature. In this role, the Committee would seek to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. The Agency’s inspectorate has had to face new, unexpected and expanding challenges in the past few years, including the untangling of a dangerous covert nuclear supply network, as well as investigations of covert nuclear programs, which included hidden nuclear facilities, undeclared material and undeclared activities. These investigations may require new or innovative measures to bring them to a successful close. We also believe the Committee should study whether there are any measures that could be brought to bear on emerging proliferation threats emanating from non-state actors.
We believe the proposed Committee should assess whether the Agency has been using all of the tools at its disposal. Put another way, are agency inspectors exercising the full range of their inspection rights? Are there any new technical measures, requiring no changes to safeguards agreements, that could be brought to bear on difficult investigations? Are there any cutting edge technologies that could be applied by Agency inspectors? Are these measures technically sound and cost-effective? Would giving inspectors greater rights of access contribute to a more effective and efficient program?
The international community must be vigilant and take concerted action to respond to the latest nuclear proliferation challenges. Just as the international community responded to the serious non-proliferation challenges of the early 1990s, we have to take stock of recent developments and adapt the safeguards system accordingly. The nuclear proliferation threat is not static and neither should we. The safeguards system needs to adjust to the changing threat that we all confront. I hope we can agree that that ought to be one of our main tasks.
Madam Chair, I want to reiterate the point out that the Special Committee, as proposed, would be advisory in nature; it would be created by the Board, be of the Board, and deliberate on behalf of the Board. The Special Committee would have no independent decision-making authority and would not be able to intervene in the day-to-day operations of the Department of Safeguards. Any recommendations emanating from the Committee would be reviewed by the Board, and accepted, rejected, ignored, or modified as the Board sees fit. Of course, we anticipate that the Committee would provide a catalyst for new ideas, and new methodologies that could be helpful for keeping pace with the changing international security environment, as they relates to safeguards.
The Special Committee role is intended to be additive to the Board’s and Agency’s work, not duplicative. It would not dilute any activity of the Agency or the Board. Instead, the Committee actions are intended to strengthen the Agency efficiency and effectiveness by augmenting the work of the Board.
My Government believes that the Special Committee on Safeguards and Verification can help strengthen all the pillars of the IAEA – technology, safety and verification. The most immediate step we can take is to begin to forge agreement on the text of the decision document and terms of reference that have been circulated. Based on our consultations, there appear to be widespread acceptance of the principle and purpose of the Committee, but some details need to be ironed out. To that end, we stand ready to consult actively and to work with you, our colleagues here in Vienna, as well as in Washington or in capitals. Our Mission will launch these consultations in the weeks ahead and aim at closure in the near term. We prefer to seek actions at this Board, but we recognize that may not be possible; therefore, we strongly hope that when this Board convenes again in June, it will be prepared to agree to create the new Special Committee. By acting promptly to do so, we can take a step that we believe will contribute significantly to our collective security. The United States looks forward to cooperating closely with our fellow member states in order to achieve this goal.
Thank you, Madame Chair.
